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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Current Problem
To disarm, or not to disarm? This remains the primary
question during a time when concern over gun rights is growing,
and its application to “the people” has created a dichotomy in
modern American jurisprudence. The Second Amendment states,
“A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.”1 These twenty-eight words have caused considerable
debate in determining its true meaning and application to modern
issues.2 Proponents for gun rights claim regulations which promote
firearm possession reduce crime, while proponents for gun control
claim an epidemic, and argue that growing crime and violence is
linked to gun possession.34
For example, in 2015, John Hendricks, a gun proponent and
Uber driver with a registered concealed and carry permit, was
taking a break between his fares when he noticed a man yelling to

1. U.S. CONST. amend. II. (emphasis added).
2. Zachary Elkins, Rewrite the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/opinion/rewrite-the-second-amendment.h
tml.
3. The Editorial Board, End the Gun Epidemic in America, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/opinion/end-the-gun-epidemic-in-ameri
ca.html.
4. Eric Lichtbau, Gun-Control Groups Push Growing Evidence that Law
Reduce Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/us
/gun-control-national-rifle-association.html.
199
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a group of people from the side of the street. 5 The bystander began
open firing onto a crowd of people, which led Hendricks to
immediately unload his registered firearm and shot the man six
times before calling 911.6 Hendricks’ quick reaction may have
diffused a potential mass shooting, offering support to gun rights
advocates who argue that gun laws should allow people to defend
themselves and others.7 These advocates state events like the
Chicago shooting demonstrate that gun rights reflect protection of
people.8 Conversely, events like the Virginia Tech shooting provides
support for anti-gun rights advocates who assert that easy access to
guns lead to tragedies.9 What is clear is school shootings
increasingly involve more guns, which is leading to more deaths
than ever before.10 In response to the many cases of self-defense
mass shootings, people have been turning to policy makers to create
5. Geoff Ziezulweicz, Concealed carry shootings now part of Chicago’s gun
reality, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015), www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-concealedcarry-shooting-interview-met-20151120-story.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Dean Weingarten, Police in Chicago Give Hero his Gun Back, THE TRUTH
ABOUT GUNS (Dec. 5, 2015), www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2015/12/dean-wein
garten/police-in-chicago-give-hero-his-gun-back/; see also J.D. Heyes, Armed
Civilians Save lives and Reduce the Number Killed in Mass, NAT. NEWS (Dec.
29, 2015), www.gmogottago.com/armed-civilians-save-lives-and-reduce-the-nu
mber-killed/ (discussing people who have used their concealed firearms for selfdefense or protection purposes. Moreover, the article suggests studies are often
conflated with misrepresented statistics, and that most people use their
firearms generally only for self defense).
9. Amy Shuffelton, Virginia Tech Shooting anniversary: Guns, schools,
children and the laws we need, THE HILL (Apr. 16, 2017), www.thehill.
com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/329031-virginia-tech-shooting-ann
iversary-guns-schools (discussing how school shootings have been an
increasingly prevalent phenomenon, but that children are at an even greater
risk of being shot at a friend’s house). Eighty-nine percent of gun related deaths
to children occur in homes. Id. In other words, accidental gun related deaths
are increasing, but so are non-accidental gun related deaths, and the law should
change to reflect these facts. Id.; see also, Stacey Leasca, Have gun laws gotten
more lax since Columbine? Here’s what you need to know., MIC (Apr. 20, 2017),
mic.com/articles/174724/have-gun-laws-gotten-more-lax-since-columbine-heres-what-you-need-to-know#.ht5rSapqA (discussing Congress’s immediate
reaction to the Columbine shooting was putting forth more than eight-hundred
new bills dealing with guns, background checks, and regulations to prevent
these kinds of shootings). However, federally, not much has changed in response
to many of these shootings, but laws have changed significantly. Gun laws vary
depending on the state, and gun lobbying groups such as the NRA often prevent
any meaningful change from occurring. Id.; Zac Anderson, Sandy Hook parent
criticizes Steube’s gun bills, HERALD TRIB. (Apr. 3, 2017), www.heraldtribune.co
m/news/20170403/sandy-hook-parent-criticizes-steubes-gun-bills (comparing
parents’ tragedies like the Sandy Hook shooting who vehemently oppose gun
rights supporters, with those who advocate for gun control. In response to bills
proposing conceal and carry being allowed at schools, these parents state if guns
made countries safe, America would be the safest country ever).
10. 262 Shootings In America Since 2013, EVERYTOWN, everytownresearch
.org/school-shootings/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
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laws which impact protection and safety. 11
Since policy makers have not created laws which have been
met with public appraise, it may be the Supreme Court ultimately
deciding the policy behind gun laws.12 Prior to determining the
proper policy regulating firearm possession, determining who the
laws apply to is even more important. Although the Second
Amendment references “the people,” which people are really
included in this category?13 Is the right to self-defense applicable to
everyone legally residing in the U.S.? It is self-evident that any
natural born citizen of the U.S. enjoys these rights, but what about
a legal alien residing in the U.S. for twenty years? Would
noncitizens pose a greater threat to society than citizens? These
questions present a deeper embedded issue regarding immigrants
and public sentiment towards them. As one commentator states,
“Forget about birthright citizenship for illegal immigrants . . . it’s
not enough that we allow criminal noncitizens to stay here illegally,
let’s give them guns too.”14Another commentator posits, “[G]iven
the common language that appears in multiple amendments, a loss
in a Second Amendment case could have enormous consequences
for the rights of undocumented immigrants who are harassed by
police.”15
Circuit Courts are split on the question of who “the people” are
in the context of the Second Amendment. The Seventh Circuit
asserts that immigrants, who are not yet citizens, have a
constitutional second amendment right to bear arms.16 Conversely,
the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits hold unequivocally that

11. Nora Biette-Timmons and Olivia Li, Peruta v. California: The Supreme
Court’s Next Big Gun Case?, THE TRACE (Apr. 13, 2017), www.thetrace.org/20
17/04/peruta-v-california-gun-case-supreme-court-concealed-carry/ (discussing
that although Heller suggests policy makers should set their own standard
regarding public gun laws, this next case should be accepted by the Supreme
Court and may set forth precedent and a standard to gun regulation).
12. Josh Bergeron, Policy makers must take meaningful steps to address gun
violence, FOX.HOUSE.GOV (Dec. 6, 2015), www.foxx.house.gov/news/documents
ingle.aspx?DocumentID=398775 (discussing that violence is increasing and
U.S. policies are not strong enough to prevent people from dying).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. II. (emphasis added).
14. Daniel Horowitz, Gun Rights for Illegal Immigrants, CONSERVATIVE
REVIEW (Aug. 27, 2015), www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2015/08/gu
n-rights-for-illegal-immigrants.
15. Ian Millhiser, Gun Rights Win a Major Victory in Federal Court, And
That’s Actually a Good Thing, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 21, 2015), thinkprogress
.org/gun-rights-win-a-major-victory-in-federal-court-and-thats-actually-a-goodthing-a25692714603#.rqf3nqlh8.
16. Josh Blackman, 7th Circuit Creates Circuit Split: Non-Citizens are “The
People” Under the Second Amendment, J.B.: BLOG (Aug. 20, 2015, 12:00PM),
joshblackman.com/blog/2015/08/20/7th-circuit-creates-circuit-split-non-citizens
-are-the-people-under-the-second-amendment/.

202

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:199

immigrants do not have a right to bear arms. 17 After providing a
brief history of Second Amendment Jurisprudence in Part II, the
debate will be subsequently analyzed in Part III regarding
immigrants and any Second Amendment Protections they may
enjoy, finally, in Part IV an economic argument for resolution of the
debate will be proposed.18

B. Brief Overview
Part II begins with a brief overview of the doctrine of
incorporation to aid in understanding how Constitutional rights
have developed, before providing a brief history of Second
Amendment jurisprudence along with evolving interpretations of
“the people,” beginning at Dredd Scott and finishing with MezaRodriguez.19 Part III analyzes and compares the Seventh Circuit’s
17. Andrew Kloster, Appeals Court Ruling Could Threaten the Second
Amendment Rights of American Citizens, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 16,
2016), www.heritage.org/firearms/report/appeals-court-ruling-could-threaten-t
he-second-amendment-rights-american-citizens#_ftn6 (summarizing the sister
circuit’s split).
18. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2004)
(where an alien was convicted for illegal firearm possession, the Seventh Circuit
interpreted “the people” to include individuals who have a substantial
connection with the country, and thereby enjoy Second Amendment rights); see
also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (where an alien
crossed the border and was assaulted by a police officer, the Court held even an
alien has redress against an officer of the law because the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment, which applied in full force to the plaintiff even though she
was an alien); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir.
2008) (explaining how a student alien pursuing a Ph.D. sought injunctive relief
to remove her name from a government “no-fly list,” the Court held since the
student pursued her degree in the United States and sought to further her
connection to the country, her significant voluntary connection entitled her to
First and Fifth Amendment protections).
19. Id.; see also Mathilda Mcgee-Tubb, Sometimes You’re In, Sometimes
You’re Out: Undocumented Immigrants And The Fifth Circuits Definition Of
“The People” In The United States v. Portillo-Muños, 53 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 75
(2012). (where the term “the people” is examined through recent approaches).
Since Portillo-Muñoz fits in with these interpretations and fits within the
Supreme Court’s “substantial connections” test, then the Fifth Circuit’s
approach is the proper approach. Id. Specifically, since the Second
Amendment’s interpretation according to the Fifth Circuit allows for different
types of rights and this approach allows a categorical approach to determining
the people and marks a departure from the traditional approaches to defining
“the people.” Id. In effect, Portillo-Muñoz allows arbitrary categorizations of
constitutional rights, which dilutes the original purposes of the Bill of Rights
and its constitutionality. Id.; but see Harv. L. Rev., RECENT CASES:
Constitutional Law – Second Amendment – Fifth Circuit Holds that
Undocumented Immigrants do not have Second Amendment Rights – United
States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 835
(2001) (where two approaches to interpret Heller are offered: either the people
are a broad group defined in Verdugo-Urquidez, which means the people are not
required to be citizens in order to enjoy Second Amendment guarantees as long
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reasoning and arguments in Meza-Rodriguez with other circuits’
arguments regarding Second Amendment rights and their
applicability to noncitizens.20 Part IV provides an economic
argument for solving the debate and contrasted with other
proposals.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Incorporation
Although Constitutional Amendments are law applicable to all
citizens, they apply only in a Federal sense. After Constitutional
privileges and immunities were whittled down to nearly nothing,
the Bill of Rights were eventually incorporated to also apply to the
states. 21 For some time after, nearly all Constitutional
Amendments were incorporated except the Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. During the evolution of the term
“the people,” the Second Amendment had not yet been incorporated,
and only after District of Columbia v. Heller was it incorporated in
the next landmark Supreme Court case. 22

as they have a “substantial connection to the country.” On the other hand, the
people may be interpreted to mean a different class of individuals than the
people which enjoy other constitutional rights); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393 (1857). (ruling an African American individual was not a person
under the Constitution because he was a slave, and therefore he could not bring
suit against his slave-owner for assault); see generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
(1978). (discussing the historical background and significance of the Dred Scott
opinion, and arguing this case was the catalyst necessary to effectuate change
and provoke the civil rights movement); see also Gregory J. Wallance, Facts
about the Dred Scott Decision, one of the causes of the American Civil War,
HISTORYNET (2018), www.historynet.com/dred-scott (where the political
motivations and effect of Dred Scott are analyzed, and used to posit this decision
as one of the leading causes of the Civil War)
20. Id.
21. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (where butcher’s
brought action to the Supreme Court alleging statutory violation and unlawful
restraint on the butcher trade, the Supreme Court held since the statute was
created to protect the public policy of protecting health for the safety of its
citizens, companies slaughtering animals in the city was a direct statutory
violation). Further, even though the statute created a monopoly depriving
butchers their right to their trade, the Court held since the law only restricted
butchers as to where they could practice their trade, and since states have
exclusive police power rights to determine where butchers may practice their
trade for public health, the Federal Constitution was not applicable in this case.
Id.
22. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748. (holding for purposes of self-defense, the
Second Amendment applies to the States in full force and cannot be abrogated).
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B. Originalism v. Nonoriginalism
This section analyzes the differing methods of constitutional
interpretation, the development of Second Amendment
jurisprudence, and the evolution of “the people” through time.
Since the Constitution is more than 200 years old, it does not
reflect changes in technology, dialect, social norms, and law, which
ultimately lead to different theories of interpretation. Proponents of
“originalism” advocate for the theory that constitutional
adjudication should be guided by the intent of the original
framers.23 In other words, “[originalism] regards the discoverable
meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as
authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the
present.”24 Upon its inception, originalism started with the framers’
intent, but also incorporated the definitions and societal norms of
particular words in that era.25
On the other hand, non-originalism is the theory of a living
Constitution. In other words, the Constitution’s meaning is not
fixed; rather, malleable and adaptable to allow “. . . a constantly
changing society while also preserving the authority of the original
document and constitutional traditions of the past.” 26 The problem
with interpreting a flexible document is the original intent of the
framers may be diluted, or lost. 27 In other words, “[t]he glaring
defect of living Constitutionalism is that there is not agreement,
and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding
principle of the evolution.”28
Ultimately, “[a]s observed by Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe, ‘people on opposite sides of the gun rights vs. gun control
argument have tended to interpret the Amendment in a way that
23. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINALISM 1, 55 (2005); see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1998) (where Justice
Scalia argues statutory interpretation has been overlooked, while urging reform
of the judicial system because judicial interpretation of statutes is inherently
flawed because the original meaning of the lawmakers intent is thus
dissipated). Justice Scalia thereafter posits that the idea of a “living
constitution” is flawed, and Constitutional interpretation and law must be
interpreted only through its original meaning because judges cannot use their
discretion to manipulate the founder’s intentions. Id.
24. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and
The Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2015).
25. Id. at 55.
26. Id. at 57.
27. John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment
and the Failure of Originalism, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 670 (2001).
28. Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J.
239, 241 (2009) [hereafter Living Originalism]
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fits their political views.’”29 ‘The originalism vs. non-originalism
debate is not a type of confirmation bias; rather, originalism is
useful in two specific categories. First, in cases of constitutional
impression and second, in categories that involve issues which the
politically oriented originalist revival movement has, “tagged as
vulnerable to attack on originalist grounds: abortion, religious
establishment, limitations on capital punishment, and so forth.”30
Although these two constitutional theories are polar opposites, both
are required to resolve the Second Amendment’s application to
noncitizens.31 Furthermore, this foundation will be critical to
understanding the court decisions elaborated on in Part III.

C. History of Second Amendment Jurisprudence
In 1857, the United States Supreme Court first interpreted the
application of Second Amendment rights in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393.32 In Scott, Petitioner-slave sought certiorari to

29. TB Colby, Unfaithful to Textualism, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 385, 386
(2004); see also Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325 (2009) [hereafter Heller High Water] (arguing the
claim that subsequent to the Heller decision, that judges and legal academics
are all now originalists, was dispelled and originalism in practice is useful only
in cases of constitutional first impression, and issues that the political
movements considered vulnerable to attacks by originalism, and therefore
originalism will remain less substantive and more of a procedural decision).
30. Heller High Water, supra note 29, at 326.
31. See generally Living Originalism, supra note 28 (where originalism and
non-originalism is compared for purposes of Constitutional Interpretation). The
author argues that despite widespread approval of originalism, the theory itself
is not uniform or coherent, and it is a disparate collection of distinct
constitutional theories which creates a fundamental flaw in originalism. Id.
Since the inception of originalism, its underlying principles have been broad,
while viewed narrowly and disagreed as to how to practically implement those
same principles. Id. Ultimately, the author proposes originalists, and especially
judges, should begin with the proposition that originalism isn’t the only
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation, and it should be narrowed
to exclude judicial discretion as a means of interpretation. Id.; see also Mark S.
Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 397 (2010) (where the
author suggests current constitutional interpretation should be affected by
prior constitutional development, for example, that constitutional
interpretation originally only applied to a small minority of the population).
Therefore, “a justification for originalism based on notions of popular
sovereignty must fail.” Id. In other words, originalism includes the idea of
original exclusions, and since the last constitutional amendments historical and
societal progress makes current constitutional amendment difficult to propose.
Id. Since this is the case, the author argues against authority of original
meaning derived from an antebellum source. Id. So, unexpected applications
can adopt in some form an argument based on original exclusions. Id.
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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determine whether an African-American slave had a Constitutional
right to sue his owner for assault? 33 The Court held the Petitioner
did not have a constitutional right, but similarly analyzed the
consequences of applying the Second Amendment to a slave. 34
The Court found that applying the Second Amendment to
slaves would provide African American citizens the right to carry
arms “wherever they went,” which was interpreted as negative. 35
This decision is a smudge on American jurisprudence which lead
jurisprudence in a more positive direction, “[Dredd Scott] is
generally regarded as a complete abdication by the United States
Supreme Court of the rule of law.”36 Moreover, “Chief Justice Taney
expressly equated ‘the people’ with white ‘citizens,’” which, in effect,
meant during this time the Second Amendment allowed any
“citizen” to carry arms wherever they went. 37 This decision
illustrates the beginning of Second Amendment jurisprudence, and
demonstrates how much it changed in the following years.
In 1875, the Supreme Court revisited the application of the
Second Amendment in United States v. Cruikshank.38 In
Cruikshank, defendants were charged with conspiracy to oppress a
citizen, with the intent to prevent their free exercise of the laws of
the United States.39 To determine the sufficiency of the counts
defendants were charged with, the Court analyzed the application
33. Id.
34. Id. at 417, 454.
35. Id.
36. Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming To The Tule of Law: When Person and
Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 391 (2006); see also Darrell A.H.
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment can Teach
us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013) [hereafter Text, History, and
Tradition] (Miller argues the previous Roberts Court demanded inconsistent
judgments from the lower courts by adhering to Second Amendment
interpretation which preserved reasonableness, but did not stay faithful to
Second Amendment jurisprudence). Therefore, the solution is to apply the
Second Amendment by way of the Seventh Amendment’s historical pattern test.
In this way, judges should not manipulate historical sources by applying their
discretion, rather apply historical patterns to pave way for future
interpretation. Id.
37. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment:
Citizenship and the Right To Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1521, 1534 (2010);
see also Dave Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What
the Supreme Court Has Said About The Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999) [hereinafter “The People” of the Second Amendment]
(When disputing the guarantees, the Second Amendment affords to “the
people,” the cases in question suggest that the Supreme Court has always
believed the Second Amendment right to be an individual right of “the people”
and not a state right). Since most of the Second Amendment jurisprudence has
been in the form of dicta only, the only proper and possible interpretation of the
Second Amendment can be that it is a right of the individual, and applies
broadly to all in this country. Id.
38. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
39. Id. at 548.
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of Constitutional Amendments to individuals. 40 Specifically, the
Court reasoned that the Second Amendment “is not a right granted
by the Constitution . . . [rather] this is one of the amendments that
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government, leaving the people to look for their protection against
any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes to
local legislation.”41 Thus, during this time, the Second
Amendment’s application to the individual to bear arms was
accepted as Federal law, and lack of incorporation had not yet
included State government in its reach.
In 1939, a man was caught transporting a double barrel
shotgun across state lines.42 The Court held, absent evidence
illustrating possession of a handgun for militia usage, that the
Second Amendment did not guarantee the right to possess the
shotgun.43 The Court reasoned that the Second Amendment was
applicable to the Militia by citing history, legislation of the Colonies
and States, and the writings of approved commentators.44
In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by US
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located
in a foreign country.45 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the
Supreme Court reviewed a noncitizen’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a search outside of the U.S., and argued the search
was unconstitutional.46 In forming its conclusion, the Court
interpreted the meaning of “the people” as referring to “a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of the community.”47
Although “the people” remained ambiguous in regards to
40. Id.
41. Id. at 553; see Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan,
543 Supp. 198 (1982) (where Vietnamese fishermen sued the Ku Klux Klan for
bearing arms, intimidation, and threats to the fisherman’s families and homes).
The Court held since the Second Amendment had not yet been directly
incorporated to the States, the defendant’s military operations had no
relationship to any state or federal militia and was therefore a violation of a
State statute prohibiting firearms. Id.; see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886) (where a militiaman marched in the streets of Chicago without a license,
the Court held the Second Amendment only limited the power of the federal
government and did not apply to the states).
42. Id. at 183.
43. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175, 178 (1939).
44. Id. at 179.
45. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 228 (5th Cir. 2001) (where “the people” confers
a personal right to bear arms).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 265.
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Second Amendment jurisprudence, Courts began analyzing the
application of Constitutional rights to noncitizens. 48 In 2006, the
Fifth Circuit held that noncitizens are unequivocally entitled to
Fourth Amendment Protection.49 When a noncitizen was prevented
from lawfully entering the U.S. and suffered physical abuse at the
hands of an officer, the Court held noncitizens are entitled to the
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under the due
process clause.50 The Court reasoned, “noncitizens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory
of the United States and developed substantial connections with the
country.”51
In 2008, the Supreme Court revisited the application of the
Second Amendment in its unprecedented case District of Columbia
v. Heller.52 In Heller, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
policeman had a Constitutional right to possess a firearm when the
State denied his handgun registration. 53 Dick Heller was
authorized to carry a handgun while on duty as a special police
officer, but was denied a registration certificate for a personal
handgun stored in his home.54 The Court divided its interpretation
into two segments: operative clause analysis, and prefatory clause

48. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006).
49. Id. at 627.
50. Id. at 623.
51. Id. at 625
52. Heller, 554 U.S. 570; see also Construction and Application of United
States Supreme Court Holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
128 (2008); That Second Amendment Confers Individual Right to Keep and Bear
Arms to Federal Statutes Regulating Firearms and Other Weapons or Devices,
56 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (where a discussion of the impact of Heller and subsequent
cases is compared to regulations on gun possession, and argues that the decision
does not operate as a retroactive rule of constitutional law which extends time
limits for firearms bans); see generally Robert Hardaway, The Inconvenient
Militia Clause Of The Second Amendment: Why The Supreme Court Declines To
Resolve The Debate Over The Right To Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 41
(2002) (the authors argue that the American Bar Association agrees that there
is no collective right for an individual to own a firearm). Arguing that there is
would take the view that there is a broad right the Second Amendment provides
for everyone. Id. Conversely, the authors argue another perspective is that the
Second Amendment provides a narrow individual right to possess a gun, and
this right is extremely narrow. Id. Ultimately, the authors argue that gun
owners should be protected, especially those who are law abiding citizens. Id.
In other words, as long as guns exist, law abiding citizens should be allowed to
own guns. Id. The authors argue that every circuit case since Miller, has upheld
the collective rights interpretation, and that even if the Second Amendment
only protected the rights of the members of a militia to carry weapons for their
duties in the militia, history supports the facts that all law-abiding citizens are
part of that same militia. Id. Moreover, common law supports this same
premise. Id. The authors criticize gun lobbyists groups as overzealous and using
tactics to threaten the basic rights of gun owners. Id.
53. Id. at 576.
54. Id.
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analysis. 55 The court ultimately held the right to self-defense was
inherent to the Second Amendment.56
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed the application of the
Second Amendment to the states. 57 As of 2010, most of the Bill of
Rights was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but some Amendments remained unincorporated –
namely, the Second Amendment.58 Although McDonald is factually
similar to Heller, the issue and outcome are starkly different. The
Court in McDonald reasoned that “The first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes ‘[a]ll persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof . . . citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’”59 In
effect, the Supreme Court, by a plurality, incorporated the Second
Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.60
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit
interpreted the application of the Second Amendment to a
noncitizen. 61 Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was
arrested while in possession of a firearm.62 Although he was
involuntarily brought to the U.S. as a child, his immigration status
was never authorized.63 The Seventh Circuit reasoned the language
in Heller unequivocally protected only authorized U.S. citizens. 64
However, the Court suggested “[o]ther language in Heller supported

55. Id. at 579-605.
56. Id. at 628.
57. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748 (2010).
58. Id. at 750.
59. Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 858.
61. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664.
62. Id. at 666.
63. Id.
64. Joseph Blochert & Darrell Miller, Incidental Burdens and The Nature
Of Judicial Review, A Response To Joseph Blocher and Darrell A.H. Miller,
What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries
of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2016) (arguing that Second
Amendment jurisprudence deals with the interpretation of twenty-seven
words). However, Dorf argues the laws are not targeting fundamental
constitutional rights and may infringe on certain rights depending on the
circumstances. Id. In other words, Heller does not contradict the approach
proposed here because Heller involves a direct burden. Id. Here, the author
argues that the Second Amendment is actually an incidental burden, because
the burdens arise from the application of historical doctrines and tradition
stemming from common-law. Id. Moreover, Second Amendment jurisprudence
disproportionately affects white Americans who own guns, and this right differs
significantly from any other rights, for example, first amendment rights, equal
protection, and liberty. Id. Ultimately, the author argues that Second
Amendment is deceptive in that it will be a difficult question to resolve, and
have the country espouse a uniform law. Id.
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that all people, including non-U.S. citizens, whether or not they are
authorized to be in the country, enjoy at least some rights under the
Second Amendment.”65 The Court posited an expansive
interpretation of the Second Amendment, and held unauthorized
noncitizens enjoy Constitutional rights when “they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country.” 66 Although the Court held the
application of the Second Amendment to Mariano as valid, 67 the
Court also acknowledged this right was not unlimited and did not
protect Mariano under intermediate scrutiny. 68
In sum, the Second Amendment originally was interpreted to
apply only to white men, but was extended to all citizens following
the Thirteenth Amendment. Although this right was recognized,
its application was limited only to the Federal Government.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment applied to self-defense, that it was an un-enumerated
Constitutional right, and was then shortly after incorporated to
apply to the states. Although states regulated gun licensing,
interference with this fundamental right was a violation of the
Constitution. Currently, a circuit split exists regarding the
application of the Second Amendment to noncitizens, and the next
section will discuss the merits of each argument.

III. ANALYSIS
First the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Second Amendment
cases will be examined and dissected for reasonableness, and then
contrasted with 7th Circuit and Second Circuit jurisprudence to
evaluate the practicality of the decisions.

A. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
In Cruiskshank, Justice Waite reasoned that the Second
Amendment has no other effect, “ . . . than to restrict the powers of
the national government, leaving the people to look for their
protection . . . by the Constitution . . . .” 69 In other words, an
individual’s right to bear arms is a consequence of the Constitution,
not because of it.70
The Supreme Court ruled, in Verdugo-Urquidez, that the
purpose of drafting the Fourth Amendment suggests limiting its
application to domestic matters.71 This suggests that the phrase
65. Id.
66. Id. at 670.
67. Id. at 671.
68. Id. at 672.
69. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
70. Id. at 553.
71. See CARLOS R. SOLTERO, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) and Limits to
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“the people,” “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.” 72 The
Court further distinguishes “the people” by contrasting the
prevalence of “person” and “accused” used in other Amendments. 73
Yet, this opinion suggests that extension of constitutional rights is
limited to the people in America, but does not extend to noncitizens
in foreign nations.74
On the other hand, Justice Stevens posits that constitutional
provisions should even apply in foreign nations. 75 For example, in
Verdugo-Urquidez, an officer was in Mexico, but the Fourth
Amendment applied to him and the plaintiff. 76 This point is further
illustrated by Justice Stevens opining, “noncitizens who are
lawfully present in the United States are among the ‘people’ who
are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights . . .” 77 Justice
Brennan characterized the majority’s holding as requiring foreign
nationals to abide by the Constitution while in our country, however
our government does not need to abide by the Constitution while
outside its borders.78 Justice Brennan reasoned that although “the
people” is characterized as a term of art by the majority, the framers
original intention derives from distinguishing American law from
British law.79 In short, “‘the people’ [are] better understood as a
the Applicability of the Bill of Right Geographically and as to Only “The People”
(1990), in LATINOS AND AMERICAN LAW: LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES
146-156 (2006) (where the opinion and the limits of Constitutional provisions
applying to noncitizens are discussed); see also Michele Levy Cohen, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Fourth Amendment Has Limited Applicability
to Noncitizens Abroad, 14 MARY. J. OF INT’L. TECH. 175 (1986) (where the
majority opinion is discussed and supported by referencing other case law,
however argues that the majority cites case law older than the dissent, and
therefore argued the majority first reached its conclusion, and later sought
supporting authority); but see Mary Lynn Nicholas, United States v. VerdugoUrquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, MARYLAND
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1324&context=mjil (where it is argued the Supreme
Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez was the first step in allowing the
Constitution to become the first casualty in the ‘War on Drug’).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id. at 268.
75. Id. at 276; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Partisan of Nonpartisanship:
Justice Stevens and the Law of Democracy, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW (2006),
ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4151&context=flr (where it
is suggested that one pervasive theme running through Justice Stevens’s
jurisprudence is a commitment to nonpartisanship).
76. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
77. Id. at 279.
78. Id. at 279.
79. Id. at 287; see also Mark W. Janis, The Verdugo Case: The United States
and the Comity of Nations, U. OF CONNECTICUT (1991), opencommons.uconn.ed
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rhetorical counterpoint to ‘the Government,’ such that rights that
were reserved to ‘the people’ were to protect all those subject to ‘the
Government.’”80
The framers designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit government
intrusion of individual rights which were pre-existing, while
suggesting the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government’s
conduct, “to all whom it seeks to govern.”81 Justice Blackmun
elaborated that any foreign national tried under U.S. laws has
effectively been treated as one of the “governed,” and thus, entitled
to Constitutional protections.82 Although the majority holds that
some Constitutional provisions apply to noncitizens in limited
conditions, the dissent’s reasoning is supported by recent case law,
and seems to properly delineate the intent of the framers. 83
In extending the substantive reach of the Bill of Rights, the
Supreme Court reasons, in Heller, that the Second Amendment
should be evaluated based on its two separate clauses. 84 First, the
right of the people, and specifically, “the people,” appear several
times in the Bill of Rights.85 Since this term unequivocally refers to
members of the political community in six other provisions of the
Constitution, “the people” can be reasonably interpreted as
applying broadly.86 Contrasting this definition with the historical
reference to militia only including able-bodied white males, the
u/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=law_papers (arguing that the
Verdugo case suggests whatever is not prohibited by international law, is
permitted, and therefore Justice Brennan’s dissent suggesting if law and order
is sought, these principles must first be adhered to in America should be
followed).
80. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 287.
81. Id. at 288.
82. Id. at 297; but see Leonard X. Rosenberg, Fourth Amendment – Search
and Seizure of Property Abroad: Erosion of the Rights of Noncitizens, NU. J. OF
CR. L. AND CRIM. (1991) (arguing the Court diverged from precedent and cast a
blind eye to fairness and the philosophy of mutuality implicit in the Bill of
Rights in general).
83. Id.; see NCC Staff, Supreme Court takes case about border patrol
shooting, CONST. DAILY (2016), constitutioncenter.org/blog/supreme-courttakes-case-about-border-patrol-shooting (arguing the effect of the Verdugo
decision echoes in a contemporary case regarding a little boy shot by a U.S.
Border Patrol officer); see also Bill Federer, What Does ‘A Well-Regulated
Militia’ Really Mean?, WND (2016), www.wnd.com/2016/10/what-does-a-wellregulated-militia-really-mean/ (arguing since America is considered a last hope
for millions of enslaved people, and because precedent seems to suggest, the
Second Amendment applies to all who seek refuge under the laws of the U.S.).
84.District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 (2008); see generally
Eileen Kaufman, The Second Amendment: An Analysis of District of Columbia
v. Heller, TOURO L. R. (2013), digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?referer=www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1240&context=lawreview
(arguing Heller will usher in a new era of gun litigation, and will present the
constitutional question: what standard should the courts use to evaluate the
constitutionality of said regulations?)
85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
86. Id.
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Court reasons “keep and bear arms” does not fit logically with this
definition, and therefore begins with a presumption that Second
Amendment rights belong individually to all Americans.87
The Court then consulted an 18th Century definition of “arms”
and concluded that there was no change in its meaning.88 Although
the Court acknowledged the defense argument that “arms” refers
only to arms available in the 18th Century, the Court rejected this
claim by referencing the First Amendment’s inclusion of modern
forms of communications, and extrapolated this reasoning to the
Second Amendment.89 The Court then unambiguously stated that
“bear” refers to carry, which was the idiomatic meaning even during
the Framer’s era, therefore rejecting any argument limiting the
right to “bear arms” to a military context only.90
In short, the Court reasoned that the Second Amendment
guaranteed an individual the un-enumerated pre-existing right to
possess and carry weapons.91 The Court further emphasized this
point by examining the historical progression of the individual right
to bear arms such as: British governments utilizing militias to
suppress political dissidents and their effect on creating the
Declaration of Rights for Englishmen, Blackstone (regarded as “the
preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation”)
citing the arms provision of the Second Amendment as a
fundamental right of Englishmen, and the Crown disarming
rebellious inhabitants and Americans reacting by positing the right
to arms as a fundamental right applying to all. 92
The Court discusses the prefatory clause, “well-regulated
87. Id. at 581.
88. Id.; see also Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation:
Originalism’s Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (2009) (arguing applying
originalist methodology to constitutional interpretation is inadequate, while
arguing the Framer’s original intent is inapplicable and implausible as the
specific and exclusive meaning given to words in the Constitution, because our
society has grown farther away from the culture, realities, and understanding
from the time of the Framers).
89. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582; see also David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants:
District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns, 69 OH. ST. L. J. 641 (2008)
(arguing original Second Amendment proponents faced their demise after the
Heller decision, but also arguing the Supreme Court de facto eliminated the
right to resistance previously enjoyed by Americans).
90. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 at 586-88.
91. Id. at 593.
92. Id. at 593-95; see also The Founders’ Documents (and more) on the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, KIM WEISSMAN’S CONGRESS ACTION NEWSLETTER,
www.tysknews.com/Depts/2nd_Amend/rkba_docs_kw/political_philosophers.ht
m (last visited Mar. 23, 2017) (positing 18th Century philosophers as
acknowledging, contemplating, and arguing that the right to self-defense, and
the ability to enact that right are fundamental and natural rights).
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militia,” and reasons given historical interpretation of the clause,
that this phrase connotes a militia upon which Congress may
conscript, but does not limit the individual right to all citizens. 93
Additionally, taking the Second Amendment as a whole, its
interpretation can logically only signify the reason as to why the
right was codified, and an explanation of the right itself.94 In other
words, the Court discusses militia to provide context for how this
right was historically interpreted, which gives the interpretation of
the right as fundamental.
Justice Stevens conversely posits that the Second Amendment
was adopted only to protect the right of the people to maintain a
militia in the States.95 Stevens supports his claims by referencing a
dearth of legislative authority that attempts to regulate private
civilian uses of firearms.96 Furthermore, the majority’s
interpretation of “the people” is inconsistent with the Framers’
intent since the constitutional protections of the First and Fourth
Amendment are not limited to non-felons, whereas Second
Amendment protections are limited to non-felons, and therefore
Stevens interpretation is congruent with previous definitions of “the
people.”97
Justice Breyers disagrees with the Majority’s conclusion
reasoning that Second Amendment protections were to protect a
militia traditionally limited by tyrants, which does not include selfdefense related interests.98 Public safety necessitates a limitation
93. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 at 595-97.
94. Id. at 598-99; see also Jeffrey Toobin, So You Think You Know The
Second Amendment? THE NEW YORKER (2012), www.newyorker.com/news/da
ily-comment/so-you-think-you-know-the-second-amendment
(arguing
the
Heller decision is ambiguous because of a push for originalism, but the future
scope of the Second Amendment will be determined by law and politics, and the
Courts will likely uphold gun control regulation).
95. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 at 637.
96. Id.; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U.L.REV. 923-81 (2009) (arguing Heller’s purpose will be
its long-term effect on the relationship between originalism as an academic
theory, and contrasted being a component of constitutional rhetoric). Further,
arguing the majority opinion will not have a generative force, and the
composition of Supreme Court Justices will ultimately determine the future of
Second Amendment jurisprudence, interpretation, and the ultimate effect of the
Heller decision. Id.
97. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 at 644.
98. Id. at 681; see generally Stephen Breyer, Justice Breyer on the Future of the
Supreme Court: The case for a judiciary better suited to our interconnected
world, THE WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/justice-stephenbreyer-on-the-future-of-the-supreme-court-1449071185
(arguing
the
interdependence of today’s world manifests itself in the court’s dockets which
poses a challenge for the judiciary, and therefore the rule of law and natural
laws should be maintained to build a just democratic society); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 681-783 (2008); see Lyle Denniston, Links to
new gun right lawsuits, SCOTUS BLOG (2008), web.archive.org/web/2009010
9214004/www.scotusblog.com/wp/links-to-new-gun-rights-lawsuits/print/ (for
current and new gun right cases); see also Lyle Denniston, More Second
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on the Second Amendment, citing primitive municipal fire-safety
laws, which prohibited the storage of gunpowder, thus proving the
Second Amendment has never traditionally been connected to
civilian gun regulation.99

B. The Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning
In Meza-Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit seemed to extend the
scope of the Heller decision.100 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Heller did not create a fundamental Second Amendment right for
the undocumented immigrant, while acknowledging that the
Supreme Courts’ references to “the people” and notions of “law
abiding citizens” and “members of the political community” are not
reflective of “the people.”101102
The Seventh Circuit acknowledges that “the people” appears in
a different context in other provisions of the Bill of Rights, however,
it reasons that since it appears in a different context, it can readily
be distinguished from its intended meaning because these
provisions deal with elections, and not individual fundamental
rights.103 Identifying “the people” as consistent with the perceived
meaning in the Bill of Rights is simply the first step here. 104

Amendment Cases, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2008), web.archive.org/web/2009
0109005949/www.scotusblog.com/wp/more-second-amendment-cases/
(for
additional current gun right and regulation cases); but see David G. Savage,
Justices’ decision triggers questions: How far does the constitutional right to gun
ownership extend? Is it ‘fundamental,’ or an it be regulate?, L.A. TIMES (June 28,
2008), articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/28/nation/na-scotus28 (suggesting Justice
Breyer’s dissent as the proper reasoning to decide the issue in Heller, while
predicting the future of Second Amendment upholding reasonable regulations
of firearms).
100. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 665, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2004);
see generally New Circuit Split: Seventh Circuit Rules that Unlawfully Present
Noncitizens with “Extensive Ties” to the United States have Second Amendment
Rights, LEGAL SIDEBAR (Dec. 17, 2015), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/extensive.pdf
(arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is of little consequence because the
Supreme Court will not rule on the issue); but see Bob Owens, Court Rules
Illegal Aliens Have Second Amendment Rights, BEARING ARMS (Aug. 25, 2015),
bearingarms.com/bob-o/2015/08/25/judge-rules-illegal-aliens-second-amendme
nt-rights/ (arguing the founding fathers would have never given criminal illegal
noncitizens rights because they are both criminals and noncitizens and
therefore should be reconsidered excluded from the Second Amendment since
the Fourth, Fifth, and Eight Circuit also support this author’s view).
101. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 at 669.
102. See also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (where the
10th Circuit also declined to infer a similar question because the Heller opinion
did not use the word citizen to settle the issue).
103. Id. at 670.
104. Id.
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Verdugo-Urquidez’s reference to “the people” as a “class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community,” is a clear indication of what
this phrase represents.105 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit identifies
the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that “noncitizens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within this
territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country,” and from this reasons this decision’s
effect “governed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
noncitizens.”106 The Seventh Circuit further reasons that since
Meza-Rodriguez was voluntarily in the United States, had
extensive ties to the United States, had attended public schools and
had developed close relationships with family members and other
acquaintances, he developed sufficient connections with this
country.107
The government argues noncitizens have not accepted basic
obligation of U.S. citizenship because a criminal record, unsavory
traits, failure to pay tax returns, and lack of employment refutes a
substantial connection to this country. 108 However, the Seventh
Circuit points out that both citizens and noncitizens may raise a
Fourth Amendment claim while having criminal records, and
concludes the government’s rationale as an irrelevant consideration
because this kind of standard would be difficult to uphold, and
because the Second Amendment is not a light switch, which can be
“flipped” depending on the facts of a case. 109
In other words, the only consideration that is relevant in
determining an alien’s constitutional protections is whether they
have developed any substantial connections with this country. 110

105. Id.
106. See United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1 (2008) (where an
involuntary alien lacks any significant connection to the United States and
therefore did not enjoy Fourth Amendment Protections”; see, e.g., MartinezAguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (the standard for determining
a noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights depends on a substantial connection
to the United States); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983
(9th Circ. 2008) (applying the substantial connections test to a noncitizen
concluding the pursuit of a post-graduate degree constituted developing a
significant and substantial connection to this country).
107. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2004)
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see Bruce Vielmetti, Unlawful immigrants can have gun rights
appeals court rules, J. SENTINEL (Aug. 24, 2015), archive.jsonline.com/news/c
rime/unlawful-immigrants-can-have-gun-rights-appeals-court-rules-b9956182
6z1-322737461.html/ (confirming that the Seventh Circuit allows noncitizens a
right to bear arms, but restricts this right similar to bans on the mentally ill,
felons, and those convicted of domestic violence); see also Jared Morgan, 2A win
could have greater implications for immigrants, GUNS.COM [hereafter
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Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Heller was not singular, the
Court reasons Meza-Rodriguez nonetheless is included in “the
people” because he is “a person” in the ordinary definition of the
term, and therefore enjoys due process rights which then must
follow he enjoys some constitutional protections as an alien. 111
Meza-Rodriguez’s
analysis
is
reasonable,
especially
considering noncitizens often come to the U.S. involuntarily. This
decision established the idea that an alien developing sufficient
connections with the U.S., and being on U.S. soil, allows such an
individual to enjoy Constitutional protections. Accordingly, these
individuals are considered part of “the people.” 112 While the Seventh
Circuit proposes to resolve the issue of noncitizens enjoying
Constitutional protections, they nonetheless reason that the right
to bear arms is by no means unlimited.113
Justice Flaum’s concurrence posits that all adults in this
country share the basic need to defend themselves, and historically
a militia constituted anyone who was in the country, which now
includes any undocumented immigrants. 114 However, the Heller
decision causes considerable doubt in this conclusion only because
of the Supreme Court beginning with a strong presumption that the
Second Amendment is exercised individually. 115
Ultimately, Justice Flaum argues he would refrain from
addressing the scope of the Second Amendment because of 18.
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (defining unlawful acts and firearms) which only
requires strict scrutiny, and under this rationale, passes
constitutional muster.116 Although relevant, Justice Flaum’s
reasoning is not consistent with the holding in Heller, and therefore
the Seventh Circuit properly posited the rule for noncitizens
carrying firearms.

C. The Second Circuit’s Reasoning
The Second Circuit’s reasoning parallels the main messages
GUNS.COM] (Aug. 21, 2015), www.guns.com/2015/08/21/second-amendment-win
-could-have-greater-implications-for-illegal-immigrants/ (arguing although the
Seventh Circuit’s decision is a win for gun rights, it will have profound ripple
effects extending into the right to be free from abusive police tactics, and the
right to protest).
111. GUNS.COM, supra note 110.
112. Id. at 672.
113. Id.
114.United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 665, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2004);
see also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012)
(arguing denying Second Amendment protections to those who enjoy Fourth
Amendment protections is unsettled and ambiguous).
115. Mesa-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 665 at 674.
116. Id.
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of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. For example, in United
States v. Cordoba, the Sixth Circuit unequivocally stated that,
“[b]ased on the reasoning set forth in Carpio-Leon, Portillo-Munoz
and Flores, and the myriad of district court cases cited above, this
Court finds that illegal aliens do not fall within the scope of
“people”. . .”117 The Fifth Circuit has similarly stated that “the
people” defined in the Second Amendment do not include aliens
illegally in the United States. 118 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has
stated that the protections of the Second Amendment also do not
apply to aliens illegally in the United States. 119
Therefore, the analysis found in Kachalsky v. Cacase, where
the Second Circuit upheld New York’s concealed and carry law in
the home, provides a baseline for comparison and similarly echoes
its sister circuit’s reasoning.120 The Court contrasts with the
Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit in asserting that history does
not guide Second Amendment jurisprudence. 121 Although the
Second Circuit ultimately upholds the concealed and carry laws, it
does not extend these laws to noncitizens (immigrants). 122 This
reasoning is suspect because the Supreme Court has already
reasoned that noncitizens still have a connection to the country, and
therefore may have extended rights, similar to the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning. However, it is important to note this has only been stated
in dicta. Therefore, the analysis should boil down to two inquiries:
(1) whether noncitizens can have a connection to this country, and
(2) whether this connection is sufficient for a Second Amendment
right.

IV. PROPOSAL
First, the general rule for Second Amendment rights will be
proposed, followed by an argument for which method of
interpretation should govern this analysis. Finally, an economic
argument for noncitizens owning guns will be presented. Second
Amendment applying to noncitizens should be interpreted through
people who have a substantial connection to this country and
117. United States v. Cordoba, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 147822, *4.
118. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643. F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011).
119. United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
120. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); but see State
v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850) (where a statute made it a crime for anyone
to be carrying a concealed weapon which was not in open sight for everyone to
view). This was to protect citizens so that people knew who had weapons on
their person, and so that people and places were all equal in terms of owning a
weapon. Id.; see also Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2011)
(another Second Circuit opinion granting summary judgment because plaintiffs
had a fair opportunity to submit materials in opposition to any counter
motions).
121. Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. at 245.
122. Id. at 274.
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whether the noncitizen has been convicted of a crime. Yet, should
this be interpreted through non-originalism? Thomas B. Colby and
Peter J. Smith suggest proponents of originalism advocate for strict
adherence to originalism rhetoric because this theory constrains
judges from interpreting law at their own discretion, and instead
forces them to interpret the Constitution using “an objective
criterion.”123 In other words, proponents of originalism that posit
interpreting an old document through the lens of its time,
discourages interpretation through discretion. 124 Moreover,
nonoriginalist interpretation “invites” judicial discretion to
supplement for objective interpretation. 125
The authors contend, however, originalism rhetoric is
inconsistent and anachronistic to modern Constitutional
interpretation because judges cherry-pick which words to interpret
to parallel their perceptions.126 The authors instead suggest being
guided by the “original meaning” of a text and stick to one theory,
rather than diverging interpretation when a particular meaning
does not parallel their perspective.127If an originalist is to interpret
the Second Amendment consistent with originalist theory, the
interpretation must be consistent with historical traditions, and
cannot be manipulated.128 As such, here the jurisprudence should
adopt a living constitution approach through the lens of historical
123. Living Originalism, supra note 28, at 250; see also GOLDFORD, supra
note 23 (distinguishing the literalism approach originalists use, contrasted with
a pragmatic approach with flexibility allowing to reflect changes in the law and
society); see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice Of The New Originalism, 99
GEO. L.J. 713 (2011) (arguing the new originalism is more accepted, but only
because the approach has sacrificed constraint. In other words, Colby posits
that new originalism contains no constraint, and now affords much greater
discretion to judges).
124. See e.g., Geoffrey Schotter, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A Remedy for
the Court’s Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241 (2010)
(discussing the fixation thesis and its implicit inadequacy as a mechanism of
constraint on judges. Shotter proposes that instead of applying the fixation
thesis, a diachronic method to interpret the constitution, and require judges to
focus on constitutional structure over time). Inherent in this approach is the
duality of interpretation which results from the constitution’s structure. Id.
125. Id. at 290.
126. Id. at 297.
127. Id. at 304-07.
128. But see Andrew Kent, The New Originalism In Constitutional Law The
New Originalism And The Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
757 (2013) (implicating a deeper meaning rooted in parts of the constitution,
and arguing this meaning is in fact the true meaning intended by the framers
of the constitution). However, Kent approaches this approach of originalism
with skepticism of any one approach capturing all the meanings intended in the
constitution, and not a philosophic skepticism, rather a practical skepticism. Id.
Kent uses religions as a metaphor arguing no prophet has ever convinced the
world that that prophet represents one faith and argues the originalism rhetoric
and methodology will always fragment similarly. Id.
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interpretation.
Others argue the Second Amendment should be interpreted
not through Constitutional modalities, but rather through the lens
of other Constitutional Amendments.129 The authors argue a Second
Amendment historical test “patterned on the Seventh Amendment
may provide a pathway to a solution.” 130 The Second Amendment’s
“emerging doctrine” should not be interpreted with the same pitfalls
inherent of the Seventh Amendment. Rather, by avoiding
balancing-tests, various categories, and recognizing the residual
institutional parameters of the newly found right, Courts could
interpret the Second Amendment with the same jurisprudence of
the Seventh allowing for a better application of the Second
Amendment to “the people.”131
This approach is with merit, but ultimately fails because it
does not consider that the Constitution is a “living document,”
which has been amended several times throughout its life, and
therefore incorporated social and political factors not present
during its drafting. The Forefathers realized this during the
Constitution’s inception, and allowed the Constitution to be
amended to allow social and political changes. 132 To apply a rigid
approach to interpret the Constitution would fail to consider
societal changes like gay marriage, women’s right to vote, and
future Constitutional Amendments. However, this approach is
inherently flawed. Like all Constitutional Amendments, each was
created within the context of particular social and political
pressures during its time. To allow Constitutional interpretation to
rely on previous or future Amendments allows those pressures to
dictate current interpretation. In other words, using the
considerations of the Seventh Amendment to interpret the Second
Amendment would create a dangerous precedent for future
Amendment interpretation.
Interpreting the Constitution through the lens of only
originalism inevitably leads to disaster; rather, gun rights
originally were applicable to, “white, propertied, first-class

129. Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 36; see also Oral Argument at
44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
130. Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 36, at 938; see also Reva B.
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
131. Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 36, at 929-30; see also In
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897) (where the court
discussed a trial by jury as an essential feature of common law, and deeply
rooted in the Due Process Clause, and American tradition).
132.See Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Women Suffragists and The
“Living Constitution”, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1456, 1463 (2001) (discussing societal
changes allowing the Constitution to incorporate and change to reflect these
changes through time); see also MCBAIN, HOWARD LEE, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION, A CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1948) (referring to the Constitution as a “vehicle of life”).
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citizens,” but this definition expanded to include other races,
genders, and eventually all citizens. 133 In other words, the definition
of the people expanded from one narrow category of people, to
broadly include most Americans. Interpreting the Constitution
through its historical lens then dispels rhetoric that noncitizens
have never enjoyed the right to bear arms. On the contrary,
noncitizens have never been a unique violent threat to America
(indeed immigrants make up a large portion of America), and
therefore their inclusion in the expanding interpretation of the
Second Amendment should not be surprising. 134
Instead the Second Amendment should be interpreted through
its original meaning, while considering nonoriginalism as well. By
treating the Constitution as a living document as well as
understanding it through the lens of its original intended meaning,
a multi-faceted flexible approach can account for not only the
Forefather’s intent, but allow a pragmatic approach to include
political and societal problems the Forefathers’ never contemplated.
This is a similar approach to the ratification of the 19th
Amendment.
At first glance, the right to vote was reserved for the white
upper class. However, as society grew, and traditional conventions
was dissipated, citizens argued “the people” included all races and
genders, which was reflective not only of this time period, but also
of original intent.135 Although obvious in today’s world, it seems
silly to argue “the people” rejected women altogether. In reality,
although the founding Fathers may not have understood the role
women play in the general population, they created a mechanism to
allow “the people” to incorporate recent developments like this. 136
This Amendment, and many others, have not been strictly
and rigidly interpreted because had they been, all of these rights
would be moot since these concepts did not exist during the
Constitution’s conception. Allowing non-citizens the right to bear
arms through the lens of originalism, nonoriginalism, and by way
of other expansive Constitutional Amendments still opens the
floodgates to several dangers. Namely, the risk of criminal
noncitizens receiving an enumerated Constitutional right.
Establishing a database for noncitizens seeking to enjoy their
Constitutional right to bear arms would remedy this dilemma.
Similar to voting, this process would require registration, and only
133. “The People” of the Second Amendment, supra note 37, at 1577-78.
134. Id.
135. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
174-76 (1998).
136. See also BLANCA RODRIGUEZ-RUIZ & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, THE
STRUGGLE FOR FEMALE SUFFRAGE IN EUROPE: VOTING TO BECOME CITIZENS
(2012).
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adhering to strict guidelines would allow an alien access to a “Gun
card.” The alien must be at least 21 years of age and not convicted
of any felonies. By setting these minimum requirements,
proponents of restricting gun rights would feel at ease because their
main argument is that noncitizens would pose a danger to all lawful
residents.137 By requiring noncitizens to register and excluding any
felonious behavior, this risk is nearly eliminated, if not completely
eradicated.138 Furthermore, by requiring a general database, any
alien carrying a gun would be easily locatable, detectable, and
would require a photo at the time of registration. By requiring a fee
to register, the government would benefit significantly through the
screening process because only those qualified would be selected,
and the remaining fees would be kept as a surplus. 139
The right to bear arms for noncitizens can be regulated and
taxed to avoid most of the negative effects associated with
noncitizens owning firearms. For example, any alien seeking to
register a firearm must go through the aforementioned procedures,
and then would be taxed annually to own the firearm. By creating
a tax of this sort, the U.S. economy can benefit from the proceeds,
while allowing noncitizens an opportunity to enjoy hunting and
personal protection.
By interpreting the Constitution through this dual lens,
creating requirements for noncitizens to obtain a gun license, and
monitoring gun usage, the Second Amendment is easily understood
to include noncitizens in “the people,” while allowing the United
States to create a mutually beneficial and respectful relationship
towards noncitizens attempting to exercise their Constitutional
rights. Ultimately, there would be negligible negative effects
because several other Amendments have been interpreted in this
way, and the registration process would suppress any remaining
fears or concerns.

137. See Anjali Motgi, Of Arms and Noncitizens, STANFORD LAW REVIEW
(2013), www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/of-arms-and-aliens/ (arguing for
allowing noncitizens an unenumerated right to bear arms).
138. But e.g., Malia Zimmerman, Right to Bear Arms? Gun grabbing
sweeping the nation, FOX NEWS POLITICS (Apr. 13, 2015), www.foxnews.com/
politics/2015/04/09/right-to-bear-arms-gun-grabbing-sweeping-nation.html
(discussing the problem lawyers face when law abiding citizens have their guns
taken away from them for failure to register their firearms with the NRA
database, and the paradox created because even gun owners don’t follow the
rules created by the Department of Justice).
139. But see, Awr Hawkins, Donald Trump to be First President since
Reagan to speak at NRA annual meetings, BREITBART (Apr. 15, 2017), www.bre
itbart.com/big-government/2017/04/15/donald-trump-to-be-first-president-sinc
e-reagan-to-speak-at-nra-annual-meetings/ (discussing Trump’s plans to create
a fugitive database and the quiet repeal of Obama-era gun control laws).
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V. CONCLUSION
The English language is often ambiguous resulting in
confusion when particular historic phrases and words are analyzed.
Although Constitutional Amendments are, for the most part,
understood and concrete, the Second Amendment continues to
provide problems to interpreters. In sum, “the people,” can be said
to include all American citizens, including noncitizens, as long as
they have a substantial connection to America. From an economic
standpoint, allowing lawful noncitizens to obtain firearms to
exercise their Second Amendment rights, while requiring
noncitizens to register is essentially killing two birds with one
stone. By allowing noncitizens the opportunity to exercise their
fundamental constitutional rights, but imposing hurdles will allow
for a better economy, while staying true to Constitutional
jurisprudence.
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